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PREVIEW—Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Company: Allocation 




The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals originally scheduled oral ar-
guments in this matter for Tuesday, March 31, 2020, at 9:00 a.m. in the 
William K. Nakamura Courthouse in Seattle, Washington. Due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Ninth Circuit has postponed oral arguments in 
this matter.  While still subject to change due to the pandemic, the court 
has rescheduled oral arguments for April 27, 2020, at 9:00 a.m. in Court-
room 2 of the William K. Nakamura Courthouse in Seattle, Washington. 
Shannon Wells Stevenson will likely appear on behalf of the Appellant. 




This case presents two issues on appeal. First, the court must de-
termine if an amount paid under a Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)1 consent decree 
constitutes an incurred and necessary response cost given that only a por-
tion of the amount paid was used for remediation.2 Second, the court must 
determine whether the district court erred in allocating twenty-five percent 
of the response costs to the Appellant.3 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
This case revolves around the clean-up costs of a former industrial 
site (“Site”) located in East Helena, Montana.4 Appellee, Asarco LLC 
(“Asarco”) and its predecessors, operated a lead smelter at the Site from 
approximately 1888 to 2001.5 During this time period, Asarco released a 
significant amount of arsenic into the surrounding environment through 
the process by which it smelted ore to recover lead and other products.6  
Appellant, Atlantic Richfield Company (“Atlantic Richfield”), is the suc-
cessor-in-interest to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company (“Ana-
conda”).7 Anaconda leased land from Asarco to operate a zinc fluming 
plant on the Site from 1927 until 1972, when Asarco purchased the plant 
from Anaconda.8 During this time frame, Anaconda also released arsenic 
 
 Nyles Greer, J.D. Candidate 2020, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at 
the University of Montana.  
1.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018). 
2.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 3, June 12, 2019, No. 18-35934. 
3.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2, May 13, 2019, No. 18-35934. 
4.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3. 
5.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 3. 
6.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
7. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6 (internal citations omitted). 
8.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6 (internal citations omitted). 
into the environment as a result of its zinc fuming operations, although at 
a lower amount compared to Atlantic Richfield.9 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
added the Site to the National Priorities List in 1984.10 EPA then sent let-
ters to Anaconda indicating it was a “Potentially Liable Party” for cleanup 
efforts under CERCLA and requested information such as how Anaconda 
disposed of waste at the Site.11 Through nefarious means, Anaconda con-
vinced the EPA that it had not contributed to contamination at the Site.12 
Accordingly, the EPA focused its efforts on Asarco’s lead smelter.13 
In 1990, the EPA and Asarco entered into a CERCLA consent de-
cree that required Asarco to take remedial measures relating to its pro-
cessing ponds.14 Asarco completed the required work and subsequently 
entered into a Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree for claims the 
EPA brought against it under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (“RCRA”).15 This agreement obligated Asarco to investigate and clean 
up all hazardous waste relating to its historic operations.16 Asarco stopped 
operating its lead smelter in 2001, although this did not affect the agree-
ment.17 
Asarco subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2005.18 
Following Asarco’s petition for bankruptcy, the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality and the United States filed proofs of claim for joint 
and several liability under CERCLA.19 This was to ensure the acquisition 
of funds needed to finish environmental cleanup at the Site.20 As a result 
of these proofs of claim, Asarco and the EPA entered into two CERCLA 
consent decrees, the second of which is at issue in this case.21 The second 
consent decree (“Consent Decree”), entered into in June 2009, focused on 
Asarco’s environmental liabilities for several sites within Montana.22 It re-
quired Asarco to pay a total of $1.8 billion to settle all its environmental 
 
9.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
10.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
11.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 9 (internal citations omitted). 
12.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 10, 16 (“The district court further found 
Anaconda was “evasive” in answering the EPA’s requests for information, withheld 
pertinent documents and communications from the EPA, misrepresented its processes 
to the EPA, and submitted false and misleading statements to the EPA. Based on these 
findings, the district court concluded Anaconda’s conduct supported an additional one 
million dollar award under the sixth Gore factor”) (internal citations omitted)). 
13.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 11 (internal citations omitted). 
14.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 11 (internal citations omitted). 
15.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13 (internal citations omitted); see 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2018). 
16.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14 (internal citations omitted). 
17.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14 (internal citations omitted). 
18.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
19.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
20.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14 (internal citations omitted). 
21.  The first consent decree, entered into in February 2009, required 
Asarco to pay $13.2 million to fund soil clean-up on off-site lands in the proximity of 
the Site. Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
22.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
claims in bankruptcy, with $111.4 million specifically allocated to the 
Site.23 The Consent Decree created a custodial trust, which the Montana 
Environmental Trust Group (“METG”) was appointed to administer, and 
transferred all of Asarco’s rights, title, and interest in the Site to the 
METG.24 The Consent Decree ensured that Asarco will not receive any of 
its money back and, if the cleanup of the Site does not utilize the entire 
amount, that the remaining money will either be used at other sites within 
Montana or returned to the Superfund.25  
Following its monetary settlement, Asarco filed a contribution 
claim against Atlantic Richfield in 2012, alleging that Atlantic Richfield 
contributed to the hazardous waste at the Site.26 The district court found 
that the applicable statute of limitations barred Asarco’s claim and granted 
summary judgment to Atlantic Richfield.27 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and re-
manded for trial on the merits.28 Following an eight-day bench trial, the 
district court held that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA.29 The 
district court determined that Atlantic Richfield’s allocable share was 
twenty five percent of the $111.4 million Asarco paid under the Consent 
Decree.30 Atlantic Richfield filed a post-trial motion to amend the district 
court’s judgment, arguing that Asarco had only established $61.4 million 
in response costs.31 The district court rejected this argument, concluding 
that the $111.4 million which Asarco paid under the Consent Decree qual-
ified as “’necessary costs of response incurred’ under 42 U.S.C. 
§9607(a)(4)(B).”32 Atlantic Richfield then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.33 
 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
Atlantic Richfield argues that the district court made an incorrect 
conclusion of law when calculating the total response cost incurred 
through the Site’s remediation.34 Atlantic Richfield avers that CERCLA 
only allows parties to recover from the amount of money they have 
 
23.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
24.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
25.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
26.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20 (internal citations omitted); see 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2018) (“Any person may seek contribution for any other person 
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title . . . .”). 
27.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 15 (internal citations omitted). 
28.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 15; see Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017). 
29.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 15 (internal citations omitted); see 
ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 353 F. Supp. 3d. 916 (D. Mont. 2018). 
30.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 15 (internal citations omitted); see 
ASARCO LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 353 F. Supp. 3d. 916 (D. Mont. 2018). 
31.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 33 (internal citations omitted). 
32.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 33 (internal citations omitted). 
33.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 33 (internal citations omitted). 
34.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 35. 
incurred as response costs for a particular site.35 Thus, it argues that the 
district court erred in determining that the entire amount Asarco paid under 
the Consent Decree was incurred as response costs because only a portion 
of the money was actually spent at the Site and uncertainty exists as to 
how the remaining money will be used—if at all.36 Additionally, Atlantic 
Richfield argues that the district court erred in allocating twenty-five per-
cent of the response costs to Atlantic Richfield.37 Atlantic Richfield asserts 
the district court used an allocation model that did not equitably devise the 
allocation amounts, given there was undisputed evidence Atlantic Rich-
field brought only a small percentage of the arsenic to the Site compared 
to Asarco. 38 
Asarco argues that because it made an irrevocable payment to-
wards the response cost at the Site, it has incurred that cost as it pertains 
to CERCLA.39 Asarco contends that the evidence shows the entire amount 
it paid under the Consent Decree will be needed to fully remediate the Site 
and, therefore, the full amount is a necessary response cost.40 Furthermore, 
Asarco contends that the district court properly allocated twenty-five per-
cent of the response costs to Atlantic Richfield because district courts have 
discretion when allocating costs under CERCLA.41 
 
A. Atlantic Richfield’s Arguments  
 
 Atlantic Richfield argues that the district court erred in determin-
ing Asarco’s necessary response costs for the Site were $111.4 million.42 
Atlantic Richfield states that, under CERCLA, Asarco may only recover 
the “necessary cost of response incurred.”43 The fact that Asarco paid 
$111.4 million dollars under the Consent Decree is immaterial as the mon-
etary amount that matters is the amount actually incurred as a necessary 
cost of response.44 From Atlantic Richfield’s point of view, its necessary 
cost of response is $61.4 million.45 This represents the amount established 
at trial that the METG will spend to remediate groundwater at the Site.46 
 On the merits, Atlantic Richfield’s argument regarding the neces-
sary response costs is threefold. First, the company contends that the dis-
trict court erred in awarding Asarco future costs by attributing the total 
$111.4 million toward the necessary response costs.47 This argument stems 
from the notion that $61.4 million has been incurred as response costs and, 
 
35.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 35. 
36.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 35. 
37.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36. 
38.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 36. 
39.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 18. 
40.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 18. 
41.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 19. 
42.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3, May 13, 2019, No. 18-35934. 
43.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2018)). 
44.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4. 
45.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4. 
46.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 37. 
47.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 37. 
thus, any excess of that amount must be seen as a future response cost.48 
Atlantic Richfield states that the statute in question includes the word “in-
cur” in the past tense, meaning that the costs must have already been in-
curred in order for them to be awarded.49 Additionally, Ninth Circuit 
caselaw makes clear that “CERCLA prohibits awards of future response 
costs.”50 
 Secondly, Atlantic Richfield contends that the district court erred 
by determining the entire amount paid in the Consent Decree was recov-
erable as a necessary response cost.51 In the context of money paid in a 
settlement agreement, a party is only entitled to seek the costs that were 
“necessary response costs incurred . . . .”52 Thus, just because Asarco paid 
$111.4 million does not mean the entirety of that money was a necessary 
response cost and therefore recoverable.53 
 Lastly, Atlantic Richfield argues that the district court erred in al-
locating the entire $111.4 million as a necessary response cost because the 
entire amount will not be used to remediate the Site and is not necessary.54 
A response cost is considered “necessary” when “there is an actual threat 
to human health or the environment.”55 Atlantic Richfield notes that the 
district court did not find a “necessary” response exceeding $61.4 mil-
lion.56 Rather, the district court found that remediation at the Site would 
protect human health and the environment at completion without the need 
of additional money.57 Furthermore, Atlantic Richfield states that Asarco’s 
argument that more will have to be done to ensure a safe environment is 
unfounded and surrounded by uncertainty, and thus the district court’s 
judgment cannot stand.58 
 Atlantic Richfield next argues that the district court erred in allo-
cating it twenty-five percent of the response costs for two distinct rea-
sons.59 First, Atlantic Richfield contends the district court abused its dis-
cretion by “disregarding the most relevant evidence and failing to explain 
its reasoning.”60 Secondly, it argues that the allocation was erroneous 
 
48.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 37. 
49.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 38 (citing AmeriPride Services, Inc. v. 
Texas E. Overseas Inc., 782 F.3d 474, 490 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
50.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 42 (quoting Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. 
Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
51.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 44. 
52.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5 (quoting AmeriPride Services, Inc. v. 
Texas E. Overseas Inc., 782 F.3d 474, 490 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
53.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5. 
54.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13. 
55.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13 (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Un-
ocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
56.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13. 
57.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 13 (internal citations omitted). 
58.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 17. 
59.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 17. 
60.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 20. 
because it was “scientifically impossible for Anaconda to have contributed 
that amount.”61 
According to Atlantic Richfield, the district court did not ade-
quately explain how it determined its allocation because, while the district 
court noted the period of ownership and made references to the “Gore fac-
tors,” it did not explain how those factors connected to facts or how they 
influenced the final allocation.62 Additionally, Atlantic Richfield contends 
that a district court abuses its discretion when it “fails to consider a rele-
vant factor that should have been given significant weight.”63 Here, the 
district court failed to consider the toxicity of the different materials each 
party brought to the Site.64 This, Atlantic Richfield argues, hindered it sub-
stantially given that Asarco brought significantly more toxic materials to 
the Site.65 Finally, Atlantic Richfield claims the evidence demonstrated it 
was scientifically impossible for Atlantic Richfield to have contributed 
twenty-five percent of the hazardous waste at the Site.66 Therefore, Atlan-
tic Richfield requests the Ninth Circuit reverse the district court’s twenty-
five percent allocation and remand with instructions on how to properly 
consider the evidence.67 
 
B. Asarco’s Arguments  
 
Asarco rebuts the arguments made by Atlantic Richfield and con-
tends the amount paid under the Consent Decree was a necessary response 
cost.68 Asarco argues that it proved Atlantic Richfield was responsible for 
a portion of the response costs associated with the Site and, as a result, it 
is entitled to “the necessary cost of response incurred . . . contingent with 
the National Contingency Plan.”69 
First, Asarco contends that it has in fact “incurred” the necessary 
response costs associated with remediation.70 While Asarco concedes that 
a party has not incurred response costs when there is no binding commit-
ment on the party to pay for remediation in the future, Asarco notes that it 
has already paid for the response costs associated with the Site and has, 
therefore, incurred the cost.71 Furthermore, Asarco states the response 
 
61.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 27. 
62.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 20; see Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, 
Inc., 969 F.2d 503 508 (7th Cir. 1992). 
63.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 20 (citing K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade 
Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
64.  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 25. 
65.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 62. 
66.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 62. 
67.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 64. 
68.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 21 (internal citations omitted). 
69.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(b)). 
70.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 24. 
71.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 24 (citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 
951 F.2d 246, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
costs it paid in the Consent Decree constitute costs it has already fully paid, 
not costs it may have to pay in the future.72 
In the event that a portion of the $111.4-million payment under 
the Consent Degree is considered a future response cost, Asarco contends 
it is still recoverable.73 Asarco notes that other circuits have held “response 
costs for future work governed by the EPA or state oversight may be allo-
cated in a CERLA contribution claim.”74 Moreover, Asarco claims that 
allowing a party to recover future response costs fits better with CER-
CLA’s purpose of having parties come forward and pay to remediate their 
environmental harms.75 
Additionally, Asarco argues the full $111.4 million paid repre-
sents a necessary response cost.76 Asarco cites the fact that EPA ordered 
the cleanup of the Site as strong evidence of a threat to the environment 
and human health.77 Furthermore, EPA recognized the arsenic in the 
groundwater near the Site was a hazard to human health and the environ-
ment. Asarco also states the experts at trial indicated that “a 99 million 
dollar pump and treat system [is] necessary to remediate the off-site 
ground water plume at East Helena Site.”78 Additional evidence indicates 
that the amount of arsenic in the water exceeds national standards and that 
additional restoration measures are needed.79 Thus, it is likely Asarco’s 
entire payment will be needed to continue remediation work at the Site in 
order to achieve a safe environment.80 
As to the issue of allocation, Asarco argues the twenty-five per-
cent apportionment to Atlantic Richfield is a correct use of the district 
court’s discretion.81 Under CERCLA, the district court has broad discre-
tion in allocating response costs.82 Furthermore, Asarco states the district 
court can allocate costs “based on any equitable factors that it determines 
are appropriate.”83 Asarco argues the district court followed these princi-
ples when it applied the Gore factors in determining the allocation 
amount.84 Additionally, Asarco contends that the district court explained 
 
72.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 27 (internal citations omitted). 
73.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 28 (internal citations omitted). 
74.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 29 (citing Am. Cyanamid Co. Capuano, 
381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004); RSR Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 496 F.3d 552 (6th 
Cir. 2007)); see also PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ross Dev. Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 729, 743 
(D.S.C. 2015). 
75.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 32 (citing Am. Cyanamid Co. Capuano, 
381 F.3d 6, 27 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
76.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 36. 
77.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 36 (citing Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. 
Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
78.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 36 (internal citations omitted). 
79.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 7 (internal citations omitted). 
80.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 42. 
81.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 43. 
82.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 19 (citing TDY Holdings, LLC v. 
United States, 885 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
83.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 43 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) 
(2018)). 
84.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 52. 
its reasoning and use of the Gore factors85 and, in doing so, the district 
court also reasonably chose an allocation method based on expert testi-
mony.86 Furthermore, Asarco contends the district court properly rejected 
Atlantic Richfield’s impossibility argument. Asarco states the evidence 
demonstrated Anaconda contributed enough hazardous materials on its 
own to trigger CERCLA liability.87 Thus, Asarco argues the district court 
did not commit any error and the circuit court should affirm the decision.88 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The court will likely begin its analysis by interpreting the statute 
at issue. Here, the statute states that a person shall be liable for “any other 
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national 
contingency plan.”89 The parties focus their attention on the word “in-
curred,” which means “[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or ex-
pense).”90 By the very definition of the term, the statute seems to favor 
Asarco’s arguments. It has literally brought a liability or expense on itself 
by coming forward and addressing the environmental cleanup at the Site. 
It paid $111.4 million under the Consent Decree, and for that reason it has 
surely incurred that expense. 
 Atlantic Richfield argues Asarco has not incurred the cost be-
cause the full amount has not been used at the Site, and thus the unused 
portion of the amount Asarco paid should be considered a future cost.91 
The court will likely find this argument unconvincing. The caselaw Atlan-
tic Richfield relies on, which indicates future costs cannot be awarded in 
a CERLA contribution claim, is flawed to the extent that it shows only that 
a party that is not bound to pay future remediation costs cannot be awarded 
those future damages.92 This situation is factually different. Asarco paid 
the $111.4 million in the Consent Decree knowing that money would be 
used to remediate the Site. And Asarco cannot recover any of the money 
it paid under the Consent Decree. Thus, the amount Asarco incurred at the 
moment it entered into the Consent Decree was a response cost incurred 
at that time. It bound Asarco to pay $111.4 million dollars, and thus rep-
resents the amount Asarco incurred.  
Furthermore, even if court views a portion of the $111.4 million 
as a future cost, it will likely determine that Asarco can still recover from 
the entire amount paid under the Consent Decree. Although not binding, 
 
85.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 57. 
86.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 58. 
87.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 60 (internal citations omitted). 
88.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 60. 
89.  42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2018). 
90.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 38 (citing Incur, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
91.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 38 (citing AmeriPride Services, Inc. v. 
Texas E. Overseas Inc., 782 F.3d 474, 490 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
92.  See Appellee’s Answering Br. at 24 (citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 
951 F.2d 246, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
Asarco highlights compelling caselaw from other jurisdictions.93 For ex-
ample, American Cyanamid Company v. Capuano showed that a party 
may recover anticipated response costs in a CERCLA contribution 
claim.94 Making a party wait to recover contribution claims until all the 
remediation has been completed would “favor a non-settling [Potential 
Responsible Party] over a [Potential Responsible Party], the antithesis of 
what CERCLA was enacted to achieve.”95 Based on this reasoning, the 
court will likely also determine that forcing a party to wait until the 
cleanup is complete would frustrate the purposes of CERCLA. Thus, the 
court will probably hold that the portion of Asarco’s Consent Decree pay-
ment not yet used is recoverable.  
Additionally, the court will likely find the cost was, and remains, 
necessary. Asarco’s arguments on this matter are compelling.96 The arse-
nic levels in the groundwater near the Site have long exceeded safety limits 
and the EPA has taken remediation actions.97 This shows that there is a 
danger to human health and the environment, qualifying the response costs 
as necessary.98 Atlantic Richfield’s arguments on this point are less per-
suasive. Atlantic Richfield argues there are institutional controls that stop 
people from drinking the ground water and thus there is no harm to peo-
ple.99 If the court accepts this argument, a party could simply claim their 
hazardous waste is safe because there are laws that stop people from com-
ing into contact with it. It does nothing to show that the amount of hazard-
ous waste in the area is at a requisite amount to be considered safe. Nor 
does this argument explain how the still-contaminated ground water is safe 
for the environment. Furthermore, although curiously not argued by the 
parties, CERCLA itself mandates that “remedial action shall require a 
level or standard of control which at least attains Maximum Contaminant 
Level Goals established under the Safe Drinking Water Act.”100 Asarco’s 
evidence that the arsenic levels at the Site exceed drinking water standards 
demonstrates threats to human health still exist and remedial work at the 
Site cannot possibly be finished.101 Accordingly, the court should view ad-
ditional remediation work to fully restore the groundwater should be 
viewed as a necessary response cost. The district court found the full 
$111.4 million will likely be needed to remediate the Site.102 Thus, the 
court should find that the full $111.4 million was a necessary response 
cost.  
 
93.  See Appellee’s Answering Br. at 28. 
94.  381 F.3d at 27. 
95.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 31 (citing Am. Cyanamid Co. Capuano, 
381 F.3d 6, 27 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
96.  See generally Appellee’s Answering Br. at 36–42. 
97.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 37 (internal citations omitted). 
98.  See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 872 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
99.  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40. 
100.  42 U.S.C § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). 
101.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 37 (internal citations omitted). 
102.  Appellee’s Answering Br. at 42. 
The court will also likely find the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by allocating twenty-five percent of the response costs to Atlan-
tic Richfield. District courts retain wide discretion to allocate the percent 
of response costs in a CERCLA contribution action.103 The fact that district 
courts can “allocate costs based on any equitable factors that it determines 
are appropriate” weighs in favor of Asarco’s arguments.104 Atlantic Rich-
field’s arguments that the district court erred by not considering the most 
relevant factors and by not explaining the factors it did consider is without 
merit.105 The evidence shows the district court considered the Gore factors 
and, in doing so, considered the amount of contamination attributed to 
each party.106 The district court explained it weighed the last Gore factor—
the degree of cooperation of the parties with different government enti-
ties—heavily in this case.107 That weighing was within the district court’s 
discretion, and the fact that this factor weighed against Atlantic Richfield 
does not mean that the court erred in allocating costs. The evidence 
showed Atlantic Richfield had been, and still was, highly uncooperative 
with governmental officials.108 Furthermore, the district court adequately 
articulated its reasoning in how it came to its conclusion and how the rel-
evant factors led to its decision.109 
Additionally, the court will likely hold the district court did not err 
in rejecting Atlantic Richfield’s impossibility argument. Atlantic Richfield 
contends its evidence proved that it was impossible for the company to 
have contributed twenty-five percent of the response costs because it 
brought a much lower amount of arsenic to the Site as compared to 
Asarco.110 However, the district court heard testimony from both parties 
regarding allocation strategies.111 The district court decided to employ 
Asarco’s expert’s allocation strategy as it included the respective periods 
of ownership, which the district court viewed as relevant.112 Moreover, the 
district court believed Asarco’s expert to have a more complete under-
standing of historic use at the Site.113 The district court was also uncon-
vinced by Atlantic Richfield’s expert analysis as to allocation because, un-
der each of the expert’s strategies, Atlantic Richfield’s allocation was 
essentially zero.114 The district court noted that it understood Asarco was 
responsible for a majority of the contamination; however, there was also 
evidence that Atlantic Richfield’s contribution would have triggered 
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CERCLA liability standing alone.115 That finding is important because a 
party cannot claim zero responsibility for cleanup costs if their actions 
alone would have triggered a cleanup process. Thus, the district court 
chose the expert allocation strategy it deemed the most reasonable and that 
accounted for important factors in the allocation strategy. This does not 
constitute clear error as Atlantic Richfield argues, but rather represents a 
district court properly exercising its discretion.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This case will decide how the Ninth Circuit will view response 
costs in CERCLA actions moving forward. Allowing Asarco to recover 
from the full amount it paid to restore the Site would indicate that amounts 
paid under consent decrees are presently incurred and do not incur at the 
point when the restoration actually takes place. This could potentially in-
centivize parties to take responsibility for contamination as they would be 
able to recover from other liable parties prior to the completion of restora-
tion activities. This case also has the potential to expand upon the meaning 
of necessary response cost under CERCLA. The court could delineate 
whether a response cost is only necessary at the period of time in which it 
accrues or, alternatively, if the total estimated amount of restoration 
equates a necessary response cost. Additionally, the decision will indicate 
the amount of deference a district court receives when determining the al-
locable share of response costs. Ultimately, this case will shed light on 
how the Ninth Circuit views CERCLA contribution claim recovery as it 
relates to CERCLA’s overall purpose.  
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